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Abstract
In the last ten years the space issue, i.e. the study of the role played
by space in economic phenomena, has attracted a lot of interest from
many economic ﬁelds. Both the suitability of spatial economics to
address questions posed by globalization, and improves in modeling
techniques are at the basis of this revolution. The combination of
increasing returns, market imperfections, and trade costs creates new
forces that, together with factor endowments, determine the distribu-
tion of economic activities. These spatial externalities makes agents’
location choice highly interdependent, thus allowing to understand
the empirical spatial correlation between demand and production pre-
viously observed by the market potential literature. Despite their
theoretical relevance, there is still little evidence, especially at large
scale level, on the eﬀective contribution of this new identiﬁed forces to
agents’ location decisions. The aim of this work is to directly estimate
a model of economic geography on some Italian regional data in order
to both test the empirical relevance of this theory and try to give a
measure of the geographic extent of spatial externalities.
Key Words: Economic Geography, Spatial Externalities, Market
Potential.
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11 Introduction
Economic activities are certainly not equally distributed in space. Moreover,
a closer look to the shape of their distribution reveals such strong regularities,
like the rank-size rule or the gravity law for example, that becomes natural
to think about it as a system endowed with a valuable economic structure.1
However, despite some interesting early contributions made by Hirschman,
Perroux or Myrdal, this issue remained unaddressed by mainstream economic
theory for a long while. As argued by Krugman [1995], this is probably
because economists lacked a model embracing both increasing returns and
imperfect competition in a general equilibrium setting. Indeed, as shown by
Fujita and Thisse [2001] in a very general setting, the price-taking hypothesis
is incompatible with the existence of a non-autarchic competitive equilibrium
in space.
The relatively recent new economic geography literature (NEG) has ﬁ-
nally provided a collection of general equilibrium models explicitly dealing
with space, and capable to account for many salient features of the eco-
nomic landscape.2 Agents choose their location on the basis of market-price
incentives. Then, the combination of increasing returns at ﬁrm level with
market power (usually in the form of monopolistic competition) and trans-
portation costs, give rise to an endogenous agglomeration, provided that
centripetal forces are suﬃciently strong. This process is best analyzed is
terms of spatial pecuniary externalities. When some workers/ﬁrms choose to
migrate/delocate, they are likely to aﬀect prices prevailing in both the labor
and product market in the two locations of origin and destination. Thus,
the location choice of some agents has an impact trough prices (so the pe-
cuniary nature) on other agents creating an externality. Moreover, as Fujita
and Thisse [2001] observed, such pecuniary externalities are especially rel-
evant in the context of imperfectly competitive markets because prices do
not reﬂect the social values of individual decisions. At this point increasing
returns operates: if they are suﬃciently strong to overcome competition for
markets and factors, agents will ﬁnd it convenient to agglomerate.
As Krugman [1995] himself pointed out, there is a strong connection
between the NEG and some older ﬁelds in economics. To a large extent,
what have been actually done is in fact rediscovering concepts and ideas that
did not receive much attention by mainstream economic theory because of
their lack of a rigorous formal counterpart.3 Within this group of overlooked
1For a good exposition of these arguments see Krugman [1995].
2See Fujita and Thisse [1996], Ottaviano and Puga [1998], and Fujita, Krugman and
Venables [1999] for a review of the literature.
3Examples are L¨ orsh (1940) and Christaller (1933) central place theory, Rosenstein-
2contributions, and of particular interest for the present work, is the literature
on market potential begun by Harris (1954). This literature argued that
ﬁrms’ desirability for a location as a production site depends on its access to
markets, and that the quality of this access may be described by an index
of market potential which is a weighted sum of the purchasing power of
all other locations, with weights depending inversely on distance. Although
this approach has proved to be empirically quite powerful in analyzing the
location of industry, it totally lacked any microeconomic foundation. At that
time there were in fact no rigorous explanations of why a correlation between
market access and ﬁrms’ location should exists. However, Krugman [1992],
Fujita and Krugman [1995], and Fujita, Krugman and Venables [1999] shows
that market potential functions can be obtained from formal spatial general-
equilibrium models, thus providing the theoretical background for the use of
such approach to study the distribution pattern of economic activities.
The main objective of this work is to estimate a market potential func-
tion, coming from a formal model, using data for Italian provinces. The
particular model used is a multi-location extension of Helpman [1998], the
latter being a variant of the well-known Krugman [1991] and Krugman [1992]
core-periphery models. From an empirical point of view, Helpman [1998] is
in fact preferable to Krugman’s models because of the less extreme nature of
its equilibria.4 This will in turn allow us to:
1. Obtain estimates of structural parameters to infer about the consis-
tency of Helpman’s model with reality.
2. Compare the explanatory power of our theory-based market potential
function with that of the classic linear one, used extensively in litera-
ture, to evaluate the speciﬁc contribution of the model in understanding
ﬁrms’ location.
3. Give an idea of the extent of spatial externalities by measuring how far
in space a shock in one location aﬀect the others.
Both the strong non-linearity of the model and the nature of the estima-
tion method will make our task relatively complex, requiring the implemen-
Rodan (1943) big push, Perroux (1955) growth poles, Myrdal (1957) circular and cumulative
causation, and Hirschman (1958) backward and forward linkages.
4In Krugman [1991] and Krugman [1992], when agglomeration occurs economic ac-
tivities fully concentrate in very few locations (in many cases just one) leaving most of
the economic space completely empty. Actually, we do not observe such tremendous con-
centrations in real world. By contrast, Helpman’s model generates weaker agglomeration
patterns that are more consistent with spatial distribution of economic activities.
3tation of ad-hoc estimations routines.5
There is a growing empirical literature on the location of economic ac-
tivities, especially at low-scale geographical level. There are, however, diﬀer-
ent line of research, each relying on a diﬀerent agglomeration mechanism.6
First, agents may be drawn to regions with pleasant weather or other ex-
ogenous amenities.7 Roback [1982], Beeson and Eberts [1989], and Gyourko
and Tracy [1991] estimate the economic value of such amenities. Second,
human capital accumulation by one individual may raise the productivity
of her neighbors, making agglomerated regions attractive places to work.8
Rauch [1993], Glaeser and Mare [1994], and Peri [1998] ﬁnd that wages are
higher in cities with higher average education levels. Finally, technological
spillovers may also contribute to geographic concentration.9 A key feature of
the NEG approach we are using here is the stress on increasing returns and
markets interaction, as opposed to factor endowments (exogenous amenities),
and technological externalities (human capital and technological spillovers).
Combes and Lafourcade [2001], and Head and Mayer [2001], belong to this
category. However, the closest reference with the present analysis is certainly
that of Hanson [1998], to which we will extensively refer throughout the rest
of the paper. Hanson [1998] uses the same model to estimate the market po-
tential function for US counties. Apart from the use of a diﬀerent data set,
the novelty of our paper consists of the implementation of a more eﬃcient
estimation method and in the construction of new proxy variables to account
for the structural diﬀerences between US and Italy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical reference model: Helpman [1998]. Section 3 is devoted to give
some insights on model interpretation, and to link it closely to the market
access tradition. Section 4 describes the estimation procedure, while section
5 deals with data issues and aggregation. Detailed estimation results are
presented in section 6. Finally, in section 7 we draw our conclusions and
suggest directions for further research.
5All the routines have been implemented in Matlab 5.3 for Windows.
6See Hanson [2000] for a survey of the literature on agglomeration economies.
7See for example Rosen [1979], and Roback [1982]
8This idea is related to Lucas [1988], and Black and Henderson [1999].
9See for example Glaeser et al. [1992], Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson [1993], Hen-
derson, Kuncoro, and Turner [1995], and Ciccone and Hall [1996].
42 The Model
Imagine an economy consisting of Φ locations, two sectors (the manufacturing
sector M and the housing sector H), and one production factor (labor). The
M-sector produces a continuum of varieties of a horizontally diﬀerentiated
product under increasing returns to scale, using labor as the only input. Each
variety of this diﬀerentiated good can be traded among locations incurring
in iceberg-type transportation costs.10 Referring to two generic locations as
i and k (i,k = 1,2,...,Φ), we thus have that for each unit of good shipped
from i to k, just a fraction vi,k = e−τdi,k of it, where di,k is distance between
the two locations and τ ∈ (0,∞) is an (inverse) measure of transportation
costs, arrives at destination. This means that, indicating with pm,i the mill
price of a variety produced in location i, the corresponding delivered price
for the consumer living in k would be pm,i/vi,k. Firms receive mill prices
while consumers pay delivered. If nothing else is explicitly mentioned, pm,i
is meant to be the mill price. The H-sector provides instead a homogeneous
good, housing, that cannot be traded and whose amount in each location
(Hi) is supposed to be exogenously ﬁxed. Its price PH,i can therefore diﬀer
from one place to another and is determined by the equilibrium between local
supply and demand.11
Labor is supposed to be freely mobile, and its (exogenous) total amount
in the economy is equal to L. The equilibrium spatial distribution of our
workers-consumers is thus determined by both wages (wi), and prices prevail-
ing in each location. We will denote Li, with
Φ P
i=1
Li = L, as labor in location
i, and λi = Li/L as the corresponding share of total workers. Preferences
and technology do not directly depend upon the location where consumption
and production take place, but only indirectly through prices. Therefore it is
notationally convenient to describe them, as well as ﬁrms’ behavior, without
explicitly referring to any particular location.
Preferences are identical across all workers. As usual in NEG models,
10The term transportation costs does not simply refers to shipment costs but in general
to all costs and impediments of doing business in diﬀerent markets, like information costs,
language diﬀerences, etc.
11The major diﬀerence between Helpman [1998] and Krugman’s standard speciﬁcation
lies precisely in the nature of good H. In Krugman [1991], and Krugman [1992] this good
is supposed to be produced by means of a sector-speciﬁc factor, land, under constant
returns and perfect competition. Moreover, good H can be traded without incurring in
any cost. These assumptions, together with a full-utilization condition for land in any
location, ensure the uniqueness of its price, PH,i = PH , that can therefore be set to one
for normalization and used as numeraire. Later on, we will see how these two diﬀerent
assumptions about H will inﬂuence agglomeration incentives.
5they are described by the standard Cobb-Douglas utility function with CES
type sub-utility for the diﬀerentiated product, i.e.:
U = (CM)
µ (CH)
1−µ 0 < µ < 1 (1)
where CM stands for an index of the consumption of the M-sector vari-
eties, while CH is housing consumption. We assume that the modern sector
provides a continuum of varieties of (endogenous) size N, the consumption







0 < ρ < 1 (2)
where cm(j) represents the consumption of variety j ∈ [0,N]. Hence, each
consumer has a love for variety and the parameter σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ), varying
from 1 to ∞, represents the (constant) elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties. The bigger is σ the more varieties are substitutes: when σ is
close to 1 the desire to spread consumption over all varieties increases. If
Y denotes the consumer income, then the demand function for a variety j
coming from utility maximization is:
cm(j) = pm(j)
−σ µY (PM)
σ−1 j ∈ [0,N] (3)
where pm(j) is here the consumer-price (or delivered price) of our generic








Technology is the same across locations. Each variant of the diﬀerentiated
product needs labor to be produced. The relation between the amount of
labor used (l(j)) and the quantity of variant j produced (c(j)) is given by:
l(j) = f + βc(j) (5)
12In the original Helpman [1998] formulation, as well as in Krugman [1991] and Krug-
man [1992], N is not a mass but instead the ﬁnite number of varieties provided by the
market. However, as pointed out by Fujita and Thisse [2001], this approach is concep-
tually misleading for the monopolistic competition framework. In fact, in order to be
consistent with the requirement that ﬁrms are negligible with respect to the market, we
should consider a continuum of them. If we do not and use instead an integer number
of ﬁrms, strategic interactions actually dominates (d’Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and
Gerard-Varet [1996]). However, the way N is actually treated by Helpman, is such that
ﬁnal results are virtually unchanged. Nevertheless, we prefer to use here the continuum
formulation.
6where f and β are, respectively, the ﬁxed and the marginal labor require-
ments. The presence of the ﬁxed cost f clearly imply increasing returns.
Without loss of generality we choose the unit for labor such that c = 1.
Since preferences exhibits a symmetric love for diversity and since there are
increasing returns to scale but no scope economies, each variety is produced
by a single ﬁrm. Moreover, as soon as each ﬁrm is supposed to be small
relative to the market, ﬁrms eventually producing more than 1 (up to a set
of zero measure) variety would act as if they were actually diﬀerent.13 In
turn, this implies an identity between the mass of ﬁrms and the mass of vari-
eties with the output of each ﬁrm equating the demand for the corresponding
variety, the latter coming from consumers spread all over the Φ locations.14
Firms know consumers’ demand and choose prices in order to maximize
their proﬁts given by:
π(j) = pm(j)q(j) − w[f + q(j)] (6)
where w is wage paid by our generic ﬁrm and q(j) is its output.
However, when they look at demand structure, i.e. equation (3), it is
likely that they consider Y and PM as given. Since each of them has a
negligible inﬂuence on the market, it may accurately neglect the impact of a
price change over both consumers’ income and the price index. Consequently,
(3) implies that each ﬁrm faces an isoelastic downward sloping demand with
elasticity given by our parameter σ. Solving ﬁrst order conditions yields the






Under free entry, proﬁts are zero. This implies, together with equation
(7), that the equilibrium output is a constant given by:
q(j) = q = (σ − 1)f (8)
Note that this relation is true wherever our ﬁrm is located. As a result, in
equilibrium a ﬁrm’s labor requirement is also unrelated to ﬁrms’ distribution:
13In our framework the introduction of a new variety cause consumers to split their
income on a larger number of goods. If perceived by ﬁrms producing more than one
variety, this cannibalization eﬀect would require price strategies diﬀerent from those used
by single-good plants. However, the hypothesis of a continuum of varieties makes the
above eﬀect negligible from ﬁrms point of view.
14Actually, consumers’ expenditure for variety j, and not the quantity demanded, equals
the corresponding ﬁrm sells. The presence of iceberg transportation costs creates in fact
a discrepancy between what is shipped by ﬁrms and what consumers receive.
7l(j) = l = σf (9)
so that the total mass of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector (N) is constant
and equal to L/σf. Equation (8) has also another important drawback.











Thus, the parameter σ is (in equilibrium) also an (inverse) measure of in-
creasing returns to scale as it reﬂects the gap between marginal and average
costs.15
Firms and consumers have an address in space and must choose a loca-
tion. We can now summarize the long-run spatial equilibrium of our economy
by means of ﬁve equations introducing space indexes on preferences and tech-
nology. The ﬁrst equilibrium requirement comes from utility maximization.
Our Cobb-Douglas utility function is in fact such that the (optimal) share
of expenditure on each product is constant and equal to the corresponding
exponent. If EH,i denotes consumers’ expenditure on houses in location i,
Yi the corresponding income, and CH,i total housing consumption in that
region, then ∀i = 1,2,...,Φ we have:
EH,i ≡ pH,iCH,i = pH,iHi = (1 − µ)Yi (11)
where the second equality comes from the equilibrium between local sup-
ply and demand of houses (CH,i = Hi).
Since there is free entry and exit and, therefore, zero proﬁt in equilibrium
the value of the manufacturing production in each region equals factor earn-
ings (wiλiL). If we now suppose that each individual owns an equal share of
the total housing stock, then income in location i is given by16:
15This actually represents a weakness of the model. The parameter σ is at the same time
the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, the price-elasticity of consumers’
demand, and an inverse measure of increasing returns to scale. This will cause some
interpretation problems in our econometric analysis
16From equation (11) total housing expenditure in our Φ locations is given by EH = PΦ
k=1 EH,k = (1 − µ)
PΦ
k=1 Yk. Moreover, ∀k we have µYk = wkλkL and taking the
sum we get
PΦ




. Combining these two relations we ﬁnally get
equation (12). It is important to point out that the hypothesis of an equal sharing of the
housing stock is not crucial to our analysis. Using alternative assumptions, like that of
immobile or even absentee landlords, Helpman [1998] ﬁnds no qualitative changes in model












Moreover, for a spatial distribution of workers to be an equilibrium, there
should be no incentive to move. As they are perfectly mobile, this implies








1−µ ∀i,k = 1,2,...,Φ (13)





















with κ1 ≡ ρ−1 (H/σf)
1/(1−σ)and κ2 ≡ ρ[µ/(σ − 1)f]
1/σ. Equation (14)
comes from optimal pricing rule (7) and zero proﬁt condition (8). Condi-
tion (15) express the equilibrium between supply and demand of labor in
each location and comes from ﬁrm equilibrium labor requirement (9) and
consumers’ demand (3).
3 A market potential approach
Considering equations (11) trough (15) for each location i = 1,2,...,Φ, we get
a simultaneous system of Φ×5 equations in Φ×5 unknowns (PH,i,Yi,wi,λi,PM,i)
that summarize the equilibrium of our spatial economy. In order to give some
17The short-run characterization of the model does not include equation (13). The
dynamics is in fact supposed be driven by real wages diﬀerences, with workers moving
towards those locations oﬀering them higher real earnings. If in the long-run equilibrium
all locations have some manufacturing then (13) will be obviously satisﬁed. However,
contrary to Krugman [1991], it is really unlikely that (13) does not hold because it would
require the price of houses in the abandoned locations to be zero. This is one of the reasons
that lead us to prefer Helpman’s model for empirical purposes.
9insight about model behavior is better to start from standard results in inter-
national trade theory. Krugman [1991], and Helpman [1998] are essentially
trade models in which a certain number open-economies trade goods among
each other and factors are perfectly mobile. Technology and preferences are
the same and there is a barrier in trading abroad given by transportation
costs. If all markets were perfectly competitive and goods homogenous we
would expect, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, trade ﬂows to be
driven by factor endowments. However, the perfect mobility of at least one
production factor would prevent trade to occur in equilibrium. In fact, a well
known result in neoclassical theory of international trade is that the com-
bination of factor mobility and barriers to trade destroys any comparative
advantage leading to autarchic economies.18 This is certainly not surprising
in the light of the spatial impossibility theorem by Fujita and Thisse [2001],
and applied to our framework would mean that ﬁrms and consumers would
locate in space proportionally to the exogenous endowments Hi. Therefore,
there should be no room for market potential-type analysis as economic ac-
tivities would be distributed just as exogenous factors are, showing no other
meaningful spatial correlation.
Clearly, this is in sharp contrast with the observable features of the eco-
nomic landscape. The existence of cities, industrial districts, and regional
imbalances is thus a puzzle for the standard competitive-markets theory.
One way to get out of this trap is to advocate marshallian (or technological)
externalities in production and/or consumption. Although very popular in
urban and regional economics, as well as in economic growth theory, this
approach suﬀers of at least two serious limitations. First, it introduces ag-
glomeration almost by deﬁnition by either assuming its exogenous existence,
or using ad-hoc mechanisms.19 Second, agents’ interaction is essential to ex-
ternalities so, as long as this interaction needs a material institution to be
eﬀective (like a city or a district), the corresponding externalities are clearly
limited in their geographic extent.20
18See Gandolfo [1998].
19Urban Economics literature for example uses extensively exogenously located towns, or
central business districts (CBD) in performing its analysis. However, “when our question
is not simply how land use is determined given a pre-existing CBD, but rather how land
use is determined when the location of towns or CBDs are themselves endogenous, this
approach oﬀers little help” (Fujita, Krugman, and Mori [1999]). Concerning technological
externalities, this strategy consists in introducing directly agglomeration incentives in
agents’ behavioral functions. Clearly, this introduces agglomeration virtually by deﬁnition
and the risk of such an approach is to force economic models going beyond what we can
actually observe and test about agents’ behavior.
20Technological externalities can help understand why cities exists and why they pro-
mote growth but cannot account for larger-scale agglomeration phenomena.
10The NEG literature oﬀers the possibility to treat agglomeration in a more
ﬂexible and rigorous way by means of increasing returns, imperfect compe-
tition, and product diﬀerentiation. To understand the forces at work in
Helpman [1998] it is useful to consider the following simpliﬁed thought ex-
periment. Suppose that we have just two locations with the same exogenous
housing stock, and that the economy starts with a symmetric distribution
of ﬁrms and workers. The only candidate for equilibrium in a competitive
market world would be precisely the symmetric one as the two locations are
a priori identical. Suppose furthermore that, for whatever reason, one ﬁrm
decides to move from one region to the other. How does this aﬀect ﬁrms
proﬁtability? The presence of one more ﬁrm will increase competition in the
product and labor markets of the location receiving the ﬁrm, thus tending
to reduce local proﬁts and to make relocation unproﬁtable. If there was no
mobility of workers, this would be the end of the story and regions would
remain identical. However, the rise in the number of local varieties that can
be bought without incurring in transportation costs, and the rise in labor de-
mand and wages tend to attract more workers. This migration increases local
expenditure (a demand linkage) and eases competition in the labor market,
so tending to increase local proﬁts and to attract more ﬁrms. The demand
linkage is here particularly important because increasing returns makes pro-
duction expansion attractive, and market power gives to ﬁrms the possibility
to better exploit such potential gains.
Whether the overall eﬀect of entry is to increase the proﬁtability of local
ﬁrms (encouraging further entry thus leading to an asymmetric equilibrium
distribution of economic activities ), or to lower that proﬁtability (leading to
exit and reestablishing symmetry), depends on parameters of the model (σ,
µ, τ). As long as σ(1 − µ) > 1, agglomeration never occurs and economic
activities will be equally distributed. If instead σ(1 − µ) < 1 then, depend-
ing on the level of transportation costs, we will observe agglomeration or
dispersion.21 Conforming to intuition both a smaller degree of substitution
between varieties (lower σ), and a greater share of manufacturing consump-
tion (higher µ) causes centripetal forces to strength.22 However, the eﬀect of
21If we relax the assumption that the housing stock is the same in the two regions
things do not change that much. If σ(1 − µ) > 1 economic activities will be distributed
only according to exogenous factor endowments, even if with a slight disproportion. If
instead σ(1 − µ) < 1 then, depending on the level of transportation costs, we will again
observe agglomeration or dispersion but agglomeration can now occur only in the location
with more housing stock.
22When σ(1−µ) > 1 an increase of µ, or a decrease of σ, cause the disproportion between
the number of ﬁrms residing in one location and the corresponding ﬁxed endowments to
widen. On the other hand if σ(1 − µ) < 1 simulations shows clearly that the eﬀect it to
restrict the range of transportation costs for which symmetric equilibrium is stable.
11a transportation costs change in Helpman [1998] is diﬀerent from Krugman
[1991]. In Krugman [1991] agglomeration occurs if transportation costs are
suﬃciently small (high values of τ), whether in Helpman [1998] is the other
way round. This is due to the diﬀerent hypothesis on the homogenous good
H.23
In Krugman’s model H is a tradable good that can be shipped from one
location to another, without incurring in transportation costs, produced by
means of an immobile factor (say land or unskilled workers). The demand
for goods coming from the owners of this factor is thus tied to the origin
location, and still represents an considerable market to be served. When
shipping is prohibitive, centrifugal forces dominates because immobile de-
mand is simply too far to be reached eﬃciently, and ﬁrms ﬁnd convenient to
relocate in rural areas to both avoid transportation costs and enjoy a ﬁercer
price competition. If τ is instead suﬃciently high ﬁrms can agglomerate to
enjoy the advantages of increasing returns but still oﬀer competitive delivered
prices in abandoned regions. In Helpman [1998], is instead the need for ﬁrms
to compensate workers for the cost of housing in congested areas that can
eventually reestablish symmetry. In order to attract workers ﬁrms must in
fact provide them higher nominal wages as the price of the immobile good H
(PH,i), reﬂecting the pressure of an increasing demand, tends to be higher in
agglomerated areas. Furthermore, the lower transportation costs are the less
important the location issue is and in the limit, when shipping has no cost,
only factor endowments matter. Thus if τ raises suﬃciently ﬁrms have no
possibility to attract workers as the amount of their agglomeration incentives
is being eroded by transportation costs decline.24
23There are other models than Helpman [1998] in which a concentration of consumption
and production cannot take place for low values of shipping costs. See for example Adrian
[1996], Hadar [1996] and, although in a diﬀerent framework, Krugman and Venables [1995],
and Puga [1999]. However, one should not consider these results as opposite to Krugman
[1991] type models, but instead as complement. Each model focuses only on few of the
possible many forces one can think about in addressing location choice issues. Therefore,
each of them should be considered as a piece of a complicated puzzle; a very simpliﬁed
example of how the world can works. About the relation between markets integration and
agglomeration, the general picture coming out of from the NEG literature is, as argued by
Ottaviano and Puga [1998], one in which for high trade costs the need to supply markets
locally encourages ﬁrms to locate in diﬀerent regions. For intermediate values of trade
costs, cost and demand linkages take over and ﬁrms and workers cluster together. Finally,
for low values of trade costs location is determined by the price of those factors (like
unskilled workers) and goods (like houses) that are not mobile.
24The way the so-called black-hole condition works is also diﬀerent in the two models.
In Krugman [1991] this condition is given by σ(1 − µ) < 1, and if satisﬁed implies that
agglomeration always occurs no matter how transportation costs are. The parallel with
the irresistible attracting power of a black-hole is evident. By contrast, in Helpman [1998]
12When we come back to our original framework, considering an arbitrary
number of locations and ﬁxed factor distribution, the story becomes much
more complicated and few analytical results are available. The ﬁrst thing
to say is that we normally observe a multiplicity of equilibria. Simulations
show that agglomeration takes place by means of a self-reinforcing process
in which small initial asymmetries among locations are then magniﬁed by
market forces, leading to what Fujita and Thisse [1996] call putty clay geog-
raphy: there is a priori great ﬂexibility on where particular activities locate,
but once spatial diﬀerences take shape they become quite rigid. The actual
equilibrium conﬁguration of our space-economy is thus path-dependent25 and
markets-centrality, as well as factor endowments26, constitutes preferential re-
quirements for a location to become a cluster of ﬁrms and consumers. Other
things equal if a location has a better access, somehow deﬁned, to appe-
tizing markets some ﬁrms will initially delocate there in order to take the
advantages that markets-proximity, due to their increasing returns technol-
ogy, gives them. If the balance is in favor of centripetal forces, this will in
turn increase local wages and goods expenditure attracting workers as well
as other ﬁrms. It becomes now clear the connection of this model, with
older traditions in economics and in particular with the market-potential
literature.
Actually, Harris (1954) market-potential function relates the potential
demand for goods and services produced in a location with that location’s





where MPi is the market potential of location i, Yk is an index of pur-
chasing capacity of location k (usually income), dik is (as usual) the distance
between two generic locations i and k, and f() is a decreasing function. The
higher is the market potential index of a location, the higher is its attraction
power on production activities.
there is no proper black-hole condition because agglomeration always depends on τ.
25This is why it is usually said that history matters.
26The fact that many NEG models abstract from factor endowments considerations
assuming an equal distribution, does not mean that one wants to deny their importance.
The a priori equivalence among locations is just a metaphor used to better isolate the
forces one wants to show, as well as a convenient working hypothesis. Ricci [1999] shows
clearly how both factor endowments and NEG forces matter for the distribution of ﬁrms
and trade. Moreover, Davis and Weinstein [1998] and Davis and Weinstein [1999] ﬁnd
empirical evidence of a joint inﬂuence of comparative advantages and market access in
determining trade ﬂows at both international and regional level.
13In Helpman model, a good measure of a ﬁrm incentive to move is given by
equilibrium nominal wages. Although ﬁrms makes no proﬁts in equilibrium
(no matter where they are located), the wage they can aﬀord express their
capacity to create value once located in a particular region.27 Combining
equations (11), (13), (15) and applying logarithms to simplify things we get
the following incomplete reduced-form:


















where κ3 is a function of behavioral parameters (µ, σ, τ, f), as well as of
the equilibrium real wage coming from (13). Equation (17) really looks like
a market-potential function. It tells us that as long as agglomeration forces
are active (σ(1 − µ) < 1), the nominal wage in location i (and thus local
ﬁrms’ proﬁtability) is an increasing function of the weighted purchasing power
coming from surrounding locations (Yk), with weights given by distances
dik (this is the market access component). Moreover, the distribution of
economic activities depends also upon prices because an increase in other
locations’ housing stock (Hk) or wages (wk), cause wi in (17) to increase in
the long-run in order to compensate workers for lower housing prices and
higher earnings they can enjoy elsewhere.
A log-linear version of Harris market potential that is comparable to (17)
is given by:








with α1,α2 > 0. Equation (18) is not obtained from a theoretical model
and compared to (17) does not control for wages and prices of others lo-
cations. Although quite powerful from an empirical point of view, market
27An alternative modelling strategy, focusing more explicitly on proﬁts, have been pro-
posed by Puga [1999]. Helpman [1998] and Krugman [1991], as well as almost all models
belonging to the same class, assume that proﬁts are zero in the short-run with workers
moving from one location to another in order to equalize real wages in the long-run. In this
case ﬁrms just follow workers in order to ﬁnd the labor they need to produce. Puga [1999]
instead assumes that inter-location labor markets instantaneously clear in the short-run,
leading to real-wage equalization, while ﬁrms’ proﬁts can diﬀer from zero. In the long-
run however ﬁrms move toward those regions oﬀering higher gains and market forces will
drive proﬁts to zero. Conceptually, these short-run proﬁts are better suited than nominal
wages to express a ﬁrm gain from relocation. However, as ﬁnd out by Puga [1999], using
these two alternative dynamics produce virtually no diﬀerence, that is why we use nominal
wages as a measure of such incentives.
14potential functions like (18) lacked any microeconomic foundation. Equation
(17) and (18) will be the base-line references of our empirical investigation.
Our main goal is to estimated Helpman [1998] structural parameters and to
evaluate its capacity to interpret the distribution of economic activities as
compared to the old market potential tradition.
4 Econometric concerns
There are several issues to be addressed in order to perform our empirical
analysis. The ﬁrst thing to say is about our choice of (17) to estimates
structural parameters (µ, σ, τ). In principle, this objective would be better
achieved using simultaneous equations techniques on equations (11) trough
(15). Apart from the technical problems of such an approach, is the unavail-
ability of reliable statistics for prices of manufacturing goods (PM,i), and
houses (PH,i), at any interesting geographical level that makes this solution
unapplicable. Data on prices can in fact be found at regional level for Italy:
this is too much aggregate a unit for our purposes. Equation (17) is instead
a reduced-form of the model that does not contain these two variables, and
for which is possible to ﬁnd adequate local data. This allow us to perform
the estimation even if we actually loose some information.28
Another important aspect is related to missing variables like the pres-
ence of local amenities (nice weather, ports, road hubs, etc.) and localized
externalities (especially human capital ones) that clearly inﬂuence the distri-
bution of economic activities, but are not included in our analysis. Beyond
obvious eﬃciency considerations, if we do not account for these variables we
can potentially encounter a bias problem. In a more recent version of his pa-
per, Hanson [1998] uses statistics on local amenities and working population
to control for these eﬀect. However, we do not use such variables for two
reasons. The ﬁrst is the diﬃculty to ﬁnd these kind of data for Italy. The
second is instead related with the estimation strategy we follow. When one
thinks about both amenities and human capital externalities it is clear that
if these factors change over time, this change is very slow. The quality of
the working force, as well as the presence of infrastructures and the network
of knowledge exchange is thus reasonably constant (for a given location) in
a short interval of time. We can thus try to overcome the problem of miss-
28Actually, equation (17) comes from the combination of equilibrium relations (11), (13),
and (15). Consequently, we are not using the information contained in both equation (12)
and (14) that, together with the other three, fully describe the long-run equilibrium of our
economy.
15ing variables by using an appropriate time-diﬀerence approach.29 Applying
time-diﬀerence operator 4 on (17), and introducing explicitly the random
component εi,t we obtain the new estimation equation:





































where subscript t refers to time. Doing the same for (18) we get:
















Regression equations (19) and (20) will be those we will actually imple-
ment for estimating parameters. Taking two reference years, and the corre-
sponding statistics on w, Y , H for each location i = 1,2,...,Φ (as well as
data on distances), we will perform a space cross-section precisely by means
of (19) and (20). The two points in time we use are t−1 = 1991 and t = 1995:
a reasonably short interval for our strategy.30
Equation (19) and (20) are certainly non-linear. One possible estimation
method is thus given by non-linear least squares. However, both the form
of our equations and the nature of the variables involved raise a clear endo-
geneity issue, making the properties of such estimation method doubtfully.
29Suppose that there exists a vector of structural elements (xi), having an inﬂuence
on location incentives, that enter additively in equation (17) trough a function f(). If
we do not take into account this component, our estimates would be potentially bias due
to the correlation between f(xi) and the error term. However, even if we do not know
neither xi nor f(), as long as f(xi,t−1)=f(xi,t) these elements will just vanish by applying
a time diﬀerence on (17). Obviously, the same is true for equation (18). The reader may
note that κ3, which is a function of behavioral parameters and equilibrium real wage,
has disappeared from equation (19). However, although µ, σ, and τ are supposed to be
time-invariant, the equilibrium real wage is not. Nevertheless, the use of constant price
statistics and the short estimation interval make it reasonably constant, thus allowing to
eliminate κ3. Note also that , incidentally, by eliminating κ3 we loose the parameter f
from our estimation equation.
30In addition to his set of control variables, Hanson [1998] also uses a time diﬀerence
approach. Anyway, the joint use of these two tools did not produce signiﬁcant changes in
his estimation results, as compared to the time diﬀerence speciﬁcation only.
16The presence, on the right hand side, of a weighted sum over space of the
same variable appearing as independent (wi), is in fact a potential source of
bias. Accordingly with spatial econometrics theory, this sum is interpretable
as a space-lagged endogenous variable. Thus, as long as errors terms εi,t are
spatially correlated, we would end-up with inconsistent estimates.31 More
importantly, in the structural form of our model the variables wi are de-
termined simultaneously with incomes Yi. The circularity between factor
earnings and income is certainly not debatable in economic theory, and in
our framework implies that the Yi are correlated with disturbances leading
again to inconsistency of non-linear least squares.
The solution adopted by Hanson [1998] in order to face such endogeneity,
is the choice of the geographical reference unit. Ideally, εi,t should reﬂect
temporary shocks that inﬂuence local business cycles. The ﬁnest the geo-
graphical unit we use for locations, the smaller is the impact of such shocks
on more geographically aggregated variables. Furthermore, if these shocks
are really local their eventual spread on other regions should be quantitatively
negligible. This amounts to say that our disturbances are spatially uncor-
related, again leading to break the relation between our εi,t and aggregate
economic indicators. Consequently, the strategy used by Hanson [1998] con-
sists in taking the ﬁnest possible geographical level for the dependent variable
wi on the left-hand side of (19) and (20), while using the most (reasonable)
aggregate level for the explanatory variables ﬁguring on the right-hand side.
Actually, he uses data on w for the 3075 US counties as dependent variables.
However, for each county i he utilizes data on w, Y , H, and distances at
continental state level, so not counties data, as independent variables. For-
mally speaking, the two indexes i and k does not correspond anymore to
the same location set. Index i = 1,2...,Φ1 corresponds to US counties,
while k = 1,2,...,Φ2 corresponds to US continental states. In equation (19)
for instance he has a sum of Φ2 = 49 terms (the number of US continental
states plus the district of Columbia) on the right hand side, for each of the
Φ1 = 3075 equations to ﬁt.
From the above discussion is clear that, once we use this speciﬁcation
trick, the local shock εi,t should be no more correlated with the state-level
regressors. Hanson’s proposal is thus to apply non-linear least squares to
estimate parameters. Moreover, as a particular remedy for simultaneity he
subtracts (for each i) the speciﬁc contribution of that county in the formation
of the corresponding state aggregate variable. For example, in the case of
the observation for Los Angeles county he subtracts the housing stock of Los
31This happens precisely for the same reason for which an AR time-series process, with
auto-correlated disturbances, gives inconsistent estimates with OLS.
17Angeles from that of California (but not from other states), before using the
latter in the sum of explanatory variables.
Hanson’s idea sounds pretty good, and as long as tests do not detect
spatial correlation we can be conﬁdent about estimates consistency. How-
ever, there is something missing from his reasoning. In economic geography
theory, as well as in spatial econometrics, it is well known that the level
of aggregation matters a lot. When one is trying to interpret spatial data,
choosing diﬀerent geographical units can in fact completely change results.
It is at this point that theory should intervene to guide us. The features
of our reference theoretical model are such that, the location to be chosen
as unit should be the smallest possible, and a state is probably too big for
the kind of tensions we are trying to analyze here. Moreover, the fact that
Hanson actually mixes state and counties variables in the same equation is
quite annoying from an interpretative point of view. However, if we use a
county level for independent variables we will be back in the endogeneity
trap. This seems to proﬁle a trade-oﬀ between estimation properties and
economic interpretation.
There is indeed a way to break this trade-oﬀ that lies on the same prin-
ciple. Hanson uses state level on the right-hand side because he needs some-
thing that is uncorrelated with disturbances, but still linked with the (real)
explanatory variables at county level. Indeed, these are precisely the features
of good instrumental variables. Therefore, one can think of keeping county
level on the right hand side, and use more geographically aggregated data as
instruments for the estimation. It is clear that as long as Hanson strategy
works the other should work as well. In any case, an instrumental variable
approach would be conceptually preferable because it allow us to maintain an
homogeneous space unit on both sides of (19) and (20). Furthermore, there
is another aspect in favor of the latter: eﬃciency. Usually, least squares per-
forms better in eﬃciency compared to instrumental variables. If instruments
are poorly correlated with regressors, the variance of the estimator will be
larger than that of the least squares one. However, this suppose that the
two estimation methods are applied on the same information set, but this
is not the case here. By aggregating explanatory variables, Hanson looses a
lot of information ending with a sum of just 49 terms instead of 3075. By
contrast, all the information contained in county data would be preserved
with instrumental variables as we can keep a ﬁne geographical level also on
the right-hand side. Eﬃciency is not really a problem for Hanson’s analysis
because he has still a lot of data to ﬁt. However, Italy is relatively small as
compared to US and we will certainly not have tree thousand observation to
infer on. Eﬃciency is thus very important in our framework and instrumental
variables gives us better guarantees.
18The last choice to make is now the geographical reference unit. As already
mentioned, this should be as small as possible in order to account for both
endogeneity and the underlying theory. Helpman [1998] is in fact best suited
to describe agglomeration forces at low spatial level, because the hypothesis
of labor mobility is certainly not defendable, especially for Italy, on large
scale. Moreover the ﬁnest is our unit the more plausible is that aggregation
is successful to construct our instruments. However, too high a geographical
detail would lead to an intractable amount of information, as well as to
a data availability problem. To give an example, if we decide to work on
the about 8.100 Italian commons, we will need a matrix of distances with
8100×(8100+1)/2 = 32,809,050 free elements to evaluate. Our choice is a
compromise between these two diﬀerent needs, and will actually consist in
taking the 103 Italian provinces as reference units.
To summarize,we will thus estimate equations (19) and (20) by means of
non-linear instrumental variables techniques, using data on Italian provinces.32
Details about the aggregation procedure for the instruments, as well as data
choice and sources, are given in the next section. In order to evaluate the
performance of our such method we have also implemented a non-linear least
squares estimation following Hanson [1998]. The two strategies both rest on
the absence of spatial correlation in error terms. Consequently, the corre-
sponding correlation tests would serve as a indirect test of a correct model
speciﬁcation. As a further control for endogeneity, additional estimations are
obtained using only data on provinces with less than 1,000,000 inhabitants
(in 1991). These estimates on small provinces should suﬀer less the endogene-
ity problem. Therefore, as long as they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those obtained using the entire sample, we can be relatively conﬁdent about
the consistency of our procedure. To account for possible structural diﬀer-
ences between continental Italy and the two island of Sicily and Sardegna,
we also got estimates on continental provinces only. Finally, as a remedy for
spatial heterogeneity we use White (1980) type heteroschedasticity-consistent
standard errors.33
32A good exposition of non-linear instrumental variables properties and the associated
inference techniques can be found in Hamilton [1994]. With particular reference on their
application in spatial econometrics see Anselin [1988].
33The use of instrumental variables requires particular techniques in order to construct
test-statistics and consistent variance-covariance matrix. The White [1980] variance-
covariance estimator for instrumental variables is in fact diﬀerent from the least squares
one. For each of the two estimation methods we use here, we have applied the appropriate
inference statistics and tests form.
195 Data choice and sources
One of the most common problems in using micro-founded economic models
for empirical purposes is the choice of good proxies. Estimation requires ac-
tual data, and in some circumstances the choice of the statistic that is best
suited to approximate a theoretical variable becomes a diﬃcult task. In the
case of H, Y , and d we do not have particular interpretation problems. H is
meant to represent those goods and factors that are immobile for consump-
tion or production. Expenditure in housing services actually constitutes a
large part of the costs associated with this category. A good proxy is thus
given by the total housing stock. The variable Y should instead represent
the demand of goods, and a reasonable solution is to take total households
disposable income as a measure of a province purchasing power. Finally, d
is the distance between two generic locations. The unavailability of more
sophisticated measures of distances has lead us to use a physic metric. In
particular we adopt the crow ﬂy distance between the centers of each province
(as obtain by polygonal approximation) using GIS software.
However, when we think about w some complication arise. One natural
solution, followed by Hanson [1998], is to consider it as just labor income,
thus using county statistics on average earnings of wage and salary workers.
Although this solution may be to some extent acceptable for US, it seems
diﬃcult to argue the same for Europe and in particular for Italy. First, it is
a wide-spread opinion that in Europe conditions of local supply and demand
play a little role in the determination of wages34, thus making them unsuited
to express re-location incentives. In some countries, and this is the case for
Italy, wages are in fact set at national level for many production sectors.
Second, the relatively scarce mobility of people prevents the prices system
to clear labor markets excess-supply.35 Agglomeration externalities are thus
likely to magnify regional imbalances in both income and unemployment
rates rather than shifting massively production activities.
In line with these considerations, US economic activities are more spa-
tially concentrated than in Europe. The 27 EU regions with highest manu-
facturing employment density account for nearly one half of manufacturing
employment in the Union and for 17% of the Unions total surface and 45%
of its population. The 14 US States with highest manufacturing employ-
ment density also account for nearly one half of the countries manufacturing
34See Bentolila and Dolado [1994], and Bentolila and Jimeno [1998] for an empirical
assessment.
35Eichengreen [1993] estimates that the elasticity of interregional migration with respect
to the ratio of local wages to the national average is 25 times higher in the US than in
Britain. The diﬀerence with respect to Italy is even larger.
20employment, but with much smaller shares of its total surface (13%) and
population (21%). Figure 1, borrowed from Hanson [1998], gives an idea
of US production concentration. It depicts counties employment density in
1990 as relative to US average: the 100 most economically active counties,
with an average employment density of 1,169 workers per square kilometer
accounted for 41.2% of US employment, but only 1.5% of US land area in
1990.
By contrast, in Europe agglomeration is more a matter of income dis-
parities and unemployment. 25% of EU citizens live in so-called Objective
1 regions. These are regions whose Gross Domestic Product per capita is
below 75% of the Unions average. By contrast only two US states (Missis-
sippi and West Virginia) have a Gross State Product per capita below 75% of
the countries average, and together they account for less than 2% of the US
population. Moreover, regional employment imbalances are a special feature
of European economic space. The case of Italy is best known, with Cam-
pania having a 1996 unemployment rate 4.4 times as high as Valle d’Aosta.
But large regional diﬀerences exist in all European countries, as shown by
ﬁgure 2 borrowed from Overman and Puga [1999]. In the United Kingdom,
Merseyside has an unemployment rate 3.2 times that of the Surrey-Sussex
region; in Belgium, the unemployment rate of Hainut is 2.2 times that of
Vlaams Brabant; in Spain, Andaluc´ ia has an unemployment rate 1.8 times
that of La Rioja; in France, Languedoc-Roussillon has a rate twice that of
Alsace; and so on.
Both ﬁgure 1 and 2 suggest the existence of forces shaping the distribution
of economic activities in asymmetric way. However, the point is that the
structural diﬀerences between US and EU cause these forces to have a more
visible impact on diﬀerent economic indicators. At this point, it is probably
better to come back to Helpman [1998] to look for some guiding insights. In
that framework, w is the zero-proﬁt earning of the only production factor
(labor), and is mend to be a measure of a ﬁrm proﬁtability to re-locate in
one particular region. As long as mobility is limited, the transfer of ﬁrms
in more appetizing locations would produce unemployment in abandoned
regions while pushing factor market to full employment elsewhere. However,
the fact that basic wages are more or less ﬁxed does not prevent ﬁrms to give
them, if they have the means, other form of remunerations in order to attract
them. Therefore, one can think to use total labor expenditure per employee
as a measure of the shadow wage. However, labor is not the only production
factor in real world. In Helpman [1998] it stands for the aggregate of mobile
factor, as opposed to the immobile ones (H), and even for US it is in this
light problematic to associate w just to wages.
The solution we will adopt tries to address these issues. We ﬁrst start by
21GDP subtracting expenditure in housing services, that actually represent a
large part of ﬁxed factors costs. Using statistics on rented house number and
prices, we have in fact construct a measure of house spending per province.
Then, we subtract it to GDP and divide for active population to get our
w.36 The variable obtained is meant to represent the average mobile-factors
remuneration. Obviously, our measure contains also proﬁts. We do not
believe that this poses serious problems as proﬁt is, in principle, precisely
the variable leading ﬁrms’ to relocate.
It is now time to spend some words on the instruments we use. We ﬁrst
divide Italy in 15 zones using NUTS-2 regions and aggregating Piedmont
with Valle d’Aosta, Trentino with Veneto, Umbria with Marche, Molise with
Abruzzo, and Basilicata with Apulia. Then, for each province we use the
change (over the time interval 1991-1995) in the logarithm of the variables
w, Y , and H of the corresponding zone (reconstructed aggregating provinces
data) as instruments for (19) and the same change in w, and Y for (20). As
in Hanson [1998], we have also neutralized the speciﬁc contribution of each
province in the formation of the corresponding zone aggregate variable. We
have a set of exactly 3 (2) instruments for the 3 (2) parameters to estimate
in 19 (20). Therefore, there is no need of an optimal weighting matrix.
All nominal variables are in 1991 prices and the unit is one thousand liras.
The estimation interval is 1991-1995. Data on rented-house number and
prices come from Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT). Data on regional GDP,
population, employees, housing stock, and households’ disposable income
come from the Istituto Tagliacarne. Distances have been obtained with GIS
software and are expressed in meters.
6 Estimation results
Tables 1 and 2 show respectively our estimates for the theory-based market
potential function (19) and the Harris-style one (20) by means of instrumental
variables. Our results are, with the only exception of the parameter σ, in
line with what found by Hanson [1998]. Although we are using a completely
diﬀerent proxy for w, the choice we have made seems to be a good one for Italy
since we are able to get something that is consistent with the choice of local
wages for US. Tables 3 and 4 contains instead estimation of the same models,
but obtained using the least squares procedure. The ﬁrst column of all tables
36Actually, we subtract people looking for their ﬁrst job from active population before
computing w. The number of those looking for their ﬁrst occupation is in fact closely
related to factors (like family habitudes), that are both external to our model and vary a
lot across Italy, thus introducing a potential source of bias.
22refers to estimates produced using all provinces in the sample, while the
second and the third contain (respectively) results with small and continental
provinces only. For parameters, standard errors are in parenthesis. The
additional statistics given are the adjusted and generalized R2, a test for
the joint signiﬁcance of all parameters (F test), the White [1980] test for
heteroschedasticity of unknown form (White Test), an LM test for residuals
spatial-correlation (LM test) and, in the case of the least square method,
an additional spatial-correlation test (Moran test). The particular weighting
matrix used for both the LM and Moran tests is one over distance. For all
tests, 1% critical values are in parenthesis.
Table 1 is the most important for us, and we will start focusing on it.
Although the White test refuse heteroschedasticity at 1% level in all cases,
it does not at 5%. Consequently, we prefer to use an heteroschedasticity-
consistent variance estimator for our inference. More importantly, the LM
test of spatial correlation strongly reject the presence of such correlation.
This is a very important result because the success of our estimation proce-
dure, as well as that of Hanson, rely on it. Furthermore, estimation on small
and continental provinces in columns 2 and 3 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from those of the full sample. Consequently, we can be quite conﬁdent about
both the endogeneity and structural bias.
Turning back to our parameters in Table 1, we can note that they are all
precisely estimated, with values lying in the corresponding interval predicted
by theory. For the case of µ, it is always between 0 and 1 and in line
with reasonable values of the expenditure on traded goods. Actually, in our
stylized model product M is probably best seen as the aggregate of traded
goods, as opposed to the non-traded ones (H) like housing services. In Italy,
the share of expenditure on housing (1 − µ) is around 0.2; a value that
lies in all the conﬁdence intervals we can construct around our punctual
estimates. However, as pointed out by Hanson [1998], the fact that housing
structures are actually produced using traded intermediate inputs (such as
wood, cement, etc.) suggest us to consider the value 0.2 for 1−µ as probably
too big.
For the elasticity of substitution, we also got something consistent with
theory (σ ∈ (1,∞)) although signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Hanson’s ﬁndings.
In Hanson [1998] estimates of σ lies between 4 and 7, while here we have some-
thing around 2. We do not believe that this is due to (possible) structural
diﬀerences between US and Italy. One possible explanation could instead be
the aggregation problem. We have already mentioned that in spatial econo-
metrics the level of aggregation matters a lot. Hanson used county level while
here we have something bigger: provinces. Moreover, the fact that he mixes
county with state data in the same equations could be a potential problem
23in its analysis. We will come back to this observation when we will present
results obtained with Hanson [1998] least squares procedure. However, we
believe that our results are more consistent with the underlying theory. Help-
man [1998] is in fact a very aggregated vision of the economy with just two
products: traded goods (M), and non traded ones (H). Consequently, the
aggregate M contains goods that are actually very diﬀerent from consumers’
point of view (like cars and shoes), and we cannot certainly expect to ﬁnd
high values for their elasticity of substitution.
The other estimates to interpret in (19) are those of τ, σ/(σ − 1), and
σ(1 − µ). As expected, our measure of transportation costs is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero and positive. However, it has no direct connection with
the τ contained in Helpman [1998] because its measure is sensitive to the
choice of units in both distance and nominal variables. Therefore, we cannot
interpret it in the light of stability conditions on model dynamics like those
that can be obtained for Krugman [1991]. Concerning the quantity σ(1−µ),
one can see that it is considerably lower than 1, and in our framework this
means that centripetal forces are active. Agglomeration can thus occur, and
its strength depends on the level of transportation costs. Similar results
have been obtained by Hanson [1998]. Finally, σ/(σ − 1) should express the
equilibrium ratio between marginal and average costs. The value we got is
high compared to both Hanson’s ﬁndings and intuition, implying that ﬁrms
have a mark-up of about 100% over marginal costs. This is probably due
to the simplifying assumptions of Helpman [1998] that actually cause σ to
be at the same time the elasticity of substitution between goods, the price-
elasticity of consumers’ demand, and an inverse measure of increasing returns
to scale. In principle however σ is an elasticity of substitution, and this is
our preferred interpretation.
Table 2 shows instrumental variables estimates for Harris market poten-
tial. Again, the parameters are signiﬁcant and both positive as expected.
Spatial heterogeneity seems to be not a problem for this speciﬁcation, there-
fore we don’t use here the heteroschedasticity-consistent variance estimator.
Interestingly, compared with our theory-based relation, Harris market poten-
tial shows a smaller ﬁtting power. In all cases, the R2 of regression equation
(19) is in fact higher than its correspondent in Table 2. Furthermore, the
fact that the LM test detects spatial correlation can be interpreted in terms
of missing variables. Spatial correlation in our framework means correla-
tion between regressors and disturbances, and this can be due to the lack
of control for price variables H and w, that theory tells us to be crucial in
understanding ﬁrms location, in regression equation (20). These two consid-
erations together conﬁrm that Helpman [1998] is actually a good metaphor
of the forces at work is a space economy, and certainly capable to tell more
24consistent stories about the distribution of economic activities than the old
market potential literature.
A comparison of instrumental variables results with those obtained with
least squares in Table 3 and 4 shows clearly the lower eﬃciency of the latter.
Although we end up with a qualitatively indistinguishable outcome, stan-
dard errors are in fact considerably higher and, contrary to Hanson [1998], in
many cases estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The poor per-
formances of our Hanson’s style least square procedure are probably caused
by the relatively scarce amount of data we used. Compared to Hanson [1998]
we have just 103 units (instead of the 3,075 US counties), and a sum of
15 aggregate-zones explanatory variables (instead of 49). Nevertheless, the
use of our instrumental variables estimator has proved to be capable to give
signiﬁcant results despite the limited information available. A last remark
on least squares is about parameter σ. Although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from instrumental variables results, least squares punctual estimates for σ
are close to what Hanson [1998] found. Therefore, it seems that is the pro-
cedure itself that gives a higher measure of the elasticity of substitution. In
our view, this conﬁrm what we said about the potential bias coming from
mixing non-homogeneous spatial data in Hanson [1998].
Finally, in order to have an idea of the spatial extent of agglomeration
forces, we have simulated the eﬀect on w caused by an exogenous shock on
income, as measured by equation (17). Using our estimates of µ, σ, and
τ from Table 1 (ﬁrst column) we have ﬁrst evaluated equilibrium wages by
means of (17), using 1995 actual data on wk, Yk, and Hk. Then, we have
decreased income of provinces in Latium by 10% before re-computing wi.
Figure 3 shows the decrease in the values of wi consequent to this simulated
shock. Although we are actually under-evaluating the eﬀect of such shock37,
Figure 3 points out clearly that the impact is quantitatively considerable but,
coherently with Hanson [1998], geographically limited.
7 Conclusions
The NEG literature has provided a series of fully-speciﬁed general equilib-
rium models capable to address rigorously the agglomeration phenomenon.
The combination of increasing returns, market imperfections, and trade costs
creates new forces that, together with factor endowments, determine the dis-
37Equation (17) does not make use of aggregate budget constrain (12). Therefore, in
evaluating the eﬀect of our localized income shock on w we do not include the consequent
change in equilibrium income and factor earnings of all other provinces, as coming from
(12).
25tribution of economic activities. These spatial externalities makes agents’
location choice highly interdependent, thus allowing to understand the spa-
tial correlation between demand and production observed empirically by the
market potential literature.
Using data on Italian provinces, we have estimated two non-linear mod-
els of spatial economic relations: an Harris [1954] type market potential
function, and a market potential derived explicitly from a theoretical model
(Helpman [1998]). However, compared with the Harris type, the theory-
based relation has proved to be superior in understanding the distribution of
economic activities in space. Our results are thus consistent with the hypoth-
esis that product-market linkages, coming from increasing returns and trade
costs, inﬂuence the geographic concentration of economic activities. More-
over, parameters are in line with the underlying theory, and suggest that
agglomeration forces are actually active. However, simulations shows that,
although quantitatively considerable, the impact of such spatial externalities
is limited in geographical extent.
Our results are coherent with what Hanson [1998] found using data on US
counties. Main contributions of this paper are the use of new proxy variables,
and the implementation of a more rigorous and eﬃcient estimation method.
The choice we made for w seems to be capable to capture local agglomeration
forces for Italy. Moreover, the use of instrumental variables has lead to more
precise estimates while allowing us to maintain an uniform geographic unit
in for regression.
There are several possible directions for further research. One natural
extension of our framework would be to obtain estimates using European
data. As shown by Overman and Puga [1999], national borders are in fact
less and less important in Europe, while regions are becoming the best unit of
analysis. What really matters is spatial proximity, therefore a theory-based
investigation on agglomeration forces at European level would be desirable.
A second issue is related to the simplifying assumptions that leads Helpman
[1998] to be cumbersome for empirical interpretation. As we already saw,
the fact that σ is at the same a measure of 3 diﬀerent things is very annoy-
ing. A promising approach in tackling this problem is given by Ottaviano,
Tabuchi, and Thisse [2001]. Using a more elaborated demand structure and
transportation technology, this model allows in fact to clearly separate (by
means of diﬀerent parameters) elasticity of demand, elasticity of substitution
and increasing returns, as well as ﬁrms’ pricing policies. Finally, as shown
in Krugman and Venables [1995], Puga [1999], and Combes [1997], input-
output linkages can also be the source of agglomeration externalities. This
is particularly true for Europe in which the mobility of ﬁrms and goods is
certainly higher than that of people. This, however require the use of a more
26detailed modellization of production than the two goods-type we have in
Helpman [1998]. Of particular interest in this line of research is Combes and
Lafourcade [2001]. Using data on local labor markets, for many production
sectors, they are actually able to estimates short run re-location proﬁts for
French ﬁrms.
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31Table 1:Estimates for Helpman (1998)
Estimation method: non-linear instrumental variables























































Adjusted R2 0.6101 0.7631 0.5463
General. R2 0.3659 0.4246 0.3354
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32Table 2:Estimates for Harris market potential
Estimation method: non-linear instrumental variables





































Adjusted R2 0.1428 0.1173 0.0836
General. R2 0.0823 0.0950 0.0519
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33Table 3:Estimates for Helpman [1998]
Estimation method: non-linear least squares































































Adjusted R2 0.2623 0.2503 0.1927
General. R2 0.2934 0.3018 0.2119
Provinces All Less than 1
mil. inhabit.
Continental
No. of observ 103 94 90
34Table 4:Estimates for Harris market potential
Estimation method: non-linear least squares













































Adjusted R2 0.1174 0.0620 0.0806
General. R2 0.1326 0.1450 0.1396
Provinces All Less than 1
mil. inhabit.
Continental






































































































































































37Figure 3: Simulated w changes from income shock to the region of Latium.
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